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Abstract
Cloudlet deployment and resource allocation for mobile users (MUs) have been extensively studied in existing works
for computation resource scarcity. However, most of them failed to jointly consider the two techniques together, and the
selfishness of cloudlet and access point (AP) are ignored. Inspired by the group-buying mechanism, this paper proposes
three-stage auction schemes by combining cloudlet placement and resource assignment, to improve the social welfare
subject to the economic properties. We first divide all MUs into some small groups according to the associated APs. Then
the MUs in same group can trade with cloudlets in a group-buying way through the APs. Finally, the MUs pay for the
cloudlets if they are the winners in the auction scheme. We prove that our auction schemes can work in polynomial time.
We also provide the proofs for economic properties in theory. For the purpose of performance comparison, we compare
the proposed schemes with HAF, which is a centralized cloudlet placement scheme without auction. Numerical results
confirm the correctness and efficiency of the proposed schemes.
Keywords
loudlet; Auction Mobile cloud computing Incentive mechanism Resource allocationloudlet; Auction Mobile cloud
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1 INTRODUCTION
In recent years, portable devices such as smartphones and tablet PCs have evolved to reach a significant
performance enhancement. However, applications running on those mobile devices also consume many
This article has been accepted by Wireless Networks, contents differ from the final version. This is not the final version. This article is used
only for quick dissemination of research findings and only for education purpose.
2resources, e.g. computing, storage, et al. Particularly, multiple applications are often run on the same
devices of mobile users (MUs).
Therefore, the resource-limited mobile devices still require a lot more resources for better performance,
to tackle real-time and delay-sensitive tasks, such as Virtual Reality games and Automatic driving.
A cloudlet is formed by a group of internet-well-connected, resource-rich, and trusted computers When
the centralized cloud is too far away from MUs. Cloudlet can be utilized by neighboring MUs [1], and
it also can bring us a good solution for the resource requirement problem as described above. MUs can
achieve much better performance by offloading their delay-sensitive or computation-intensive tasks to the
cloudlet nearby [2], because the cloudlets can provide them with low-latency and rich computing resource
access [3].
The resource allocation has been investigated in the work [4], and the cloudlet deployment for task
offloading has been discussed in [5], [6]. Many efficient algorithms have been proposed in [7], [8], to balance
the workload among the cloudlets for reducing the MUs’ delay. But access points (APs) and cloudlets may
be reluctant to provide those services without any rewards, due to selfishness. To inspire cloudlets sharing
their resources with MUs, incentive mechanisms have been introduced [9], [10]. However, one cloudlet
only serve one MU in those works. Moreover, the resource in a cloudlet is always too expensive to be
employed by a single MU.
To solve the above problems, there are several challenges: 1) How to place the cloudlets at APs efficiently.
2) How to assign cloudlet resources to the MUs when each MU has limited budget. 3) How to provide
incentive for the three kinds entities (MUs, APs, Cloudlets).
Therefore, motivated by the group-buying scheme for spectrum allocation [11], we propose three efficient
auction schemes to solve the problems of cloudlet placement and resource assignment jointly, which consists
of three stages in each scheme. In the first stage, we divide all MUs into several small groups of MUs
according to the AP they connected to, and then we figure out the total budget for each group of MUs. In
the second stage, we assign cloudlets to APs. Finally, we charge MUs in the third stage according to the
matching results.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as follows.
1) We propose three auction schemes for joint cloudlet placement and resource assignment. The first
scheme randomly generates a number m according to the capacity of each given cloudlet, followed
by selecting the first m MUs according to the performance price ratio, calculating the budget for the
given cloudlet.
2) Based on the first scheme, the second scheme calculates several profitable cases and then randomly
selects one from them. It can improve the revenue of the small MU groups significantly. In the third
scheme, we match cloudlets with APs in a global way based on the second scheme.
3) We prove that all three schemes can work in polynomial time. We also provide proofs for individual
3rationality, budget balance and truthfulness. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results show
that the proposed schemes outperform the existing work in this paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes related works about incentive mech-
anisms for resource allocation in mobile cloud computing. Section 3 formulates the resource allocation
problem and describe the three-stage auction model. Section 4 introduces our algorithms in the auction
model, together with some examples. In section 5, we prove the economic properties for the proposed
auction model. Simulation results are given in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes this paper.
2 RELATED WORK
Resource allocation in mobile cloud computing is one of the fresh and meaningful topics in recent years
[12], [13]. Mobile users offload their heavy tasks to the neighboring cloudlet, this has been an appealing
way to relieve their demand for resources [14], [15]. For cloudlet deployment, many existing works such
as [3], [7], [8] care about the cloudlet placement in a given network, and most of them focus on allocation
cloudlet resource in a centralized manner. Mike and his partners [3] [7] discuss the challenge of cloudlet
load balancing, and they proposed a useful algorithm which is fast and scalable to balance the workload for
each cloudlet in the wireless metropolitan area networks. In [8], how to place cloudlets is first considered
to reduce the processing delay for tasks while the resource of the cloudlet is limited. Authors propose a
heuristic algorithm and an approximation algorithm to place cloudlets. However, those works [3] [7] [8]
do not take the cost of cloudlets and APs into consideration. Cloudlets and APs in this system may feel
reluctant to share their resource to the mobile users without any reward.
Incentive mechanisms which take those costs into consideration have been discussed in [16]. Resource
allocation schemes in those works are more flexible and intelligent. Also, the resource holder and relay
nodes are willing to serve users. The auction schemes are wildly used in the study of computer science,
the details can be seen in [17], [18]. In [16], a cooperative bargaining game-theoretic algorithm is addressed
for resource allocation in cognitive small cell networks. However, one cloudlet can only serve one MU in
those works. The group-buying idea is introduced in [11] and [19]. In [11], a group-buying auction model
is proposed to manage the spectrum redistribution, and the problem of that a single buyer cannot afford
the whole spectrum is fixed.
In this paper, we introduce group-buying model into cloudlet deployment, to divide independent MUs
into small groups based on the associated APs. Therefore, MUs of each group can afford those expensive
cloudlets, and the cloudlet may share its resources with MUs in a flexible and efficient way. Different from
our conference version [20], we have added one more auction scheme in this work and we have extended
the conference work to better present the main idea of the three stage auction scheme.
43 SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 Problem Formulation
The MU can be regarded as the buyer in our auction schemes. The cloudlet is constituted by resource-
abundant devices, it is also the seller in our auction schemes. The AP is the access point of the wireless
network for MUs, and it also can be placed with a cloudlet to improve mobile devices’ performance, so it
is the auctioneer between MUs and cloudlets.
Assume that the number of cloudlets is K . Ck indicates the kth cloudlet. Cap
k indicates the resource
capacity of Ck. As defined as in [21], the cost function of cloudlet is
Cos(k) = c(k) · w(k), (1)
where c(k) is the cost factor of Ck, and w(k) is the workload brought by MUs’ offloaded tasks. In this
paper, we try to make the cloudlet share its resources to a suitable small group of MUs rather than just
one MU. To inspire cloudlets sharing their resources, we define the reserve price of Ck, denoted as rk,
rk = c(k) · Cap
k + δ. (2)
Where Ck must be paid at least rk, no matter which group of MUs finally wins Ck. Cloudlets in this paper
may be heterogeneous, we assume that their capacity and cost factor may be different with each other, so
their reserve price will also be different. While cloudlet Ck joins in the auction scheme, its total resource
capacity Capk and cost factor c(k) are fixed. Ck cannot change them during the whole auction. Then, rk
is also fixed. By the way, Ck can adjust its reserve price rk by changing its parameter δ after a whole
auction, such as increasing the value of δ if its resource is over competitive in the market, and decreasing
the value of δ while the resource is oversupplied, which will make Ck benefit more from the auction, but
this feedback mechanism is out of the scope this paper. Therefore, we assume δ = 0 in this paper.
Assume that the number of AP is n in the given network. ai indicates the ith AP, and it is connected
with ni MUs. In this paper, MUs connect to the wireless network through AP. Therefore, we can easily
divide MUs into some groups base on the connected AP by the MUs. Each group of MUs can be assigned
at most one cloudlet, and if the group of MUs which connects with ai is assigned with cloudlet Ck, the
MUs in the group cannot request other cloudlet resource, and the cloudlet Ck can only serve for the MUs
in the group of ai. It is noteworthy that this is different with [7], where MU can request service from other
cloudlets if it’s local AP do not have cloudlet or the assigned cloudlet is out of service. In our auction
schemes, APs are the auctioneer who deals with the transaction between MUs and cloudlets.
For MUs that connected with the wireless network through the ith AP, we call them the ith group of
MUs. Different groups have different amount of tasks to offload. Let mji be the jth MU of the ith AP.
5Its valuation for each cloudlet may be different. The mobile user mji may give a higher valuation for the
cloudlet it preferred (such as the cloudlets which have a good quality of service to it). Then it will submit
a much higher bid on those cloudlets based on their valuation. Instead, mji will submit a much lower
bid on the cloudlets which mji do not like. Then, the valuations of m
j
i on the kth cloudlet Ck is v
j
i (k),
which is private information of mji . The budget of m
j
i for Ck is b
j
i (k), which is public information, as this
budget is the bid that MU submits for cloudlets. Namely, MUs’ valuation for each cloudlet depends on
their preference of those cloudlets, and is known only by themselves. Different MUs may produce different
valuations on the same cloudlet, according to their different preferences. Usually, in an auction schemes, the
buyer bid truthfully only if its budget equals its valuation. For instance, MU mji bid truthfully on cloudlet
Ck only if b
j
i (k) = v
j
i (k). But MUs’ valuation for each cloudlet is unknown to others, so the auction scheme
must be truthful enough to prevent MU benefit more by bidding untruthfully, or the auction will bankrupt
soon.
When the transactions are done after our three-stage auctions, the winner MUs will pay for the winner
cloudlets and the connected APs, the winner cloudlets will be placed on its matching AP and serve for
the small group of MUs connected by this AP. For instance, if MUs in ai wins Ck, Ck will be placed on ai,
and then Ck provides services to MUs in ai. Let wi be the winner set, which consists of the winner MUs
in the group of MUs in ai. Let p
j
i be clearing price of the MU m
j
i .
If mji is a winner, then m
j
i will be charged at p
j
i after the auction. For the case of that m
j
i bid truthfully,
we define its utility uji as
uji =


vji (k)− p
j
i if m
j
i ∈ wi,
0 otherwise,
(3)
where vji (k) is the valuation of m
j
i on the cloudlet Ck it wins. This equation implies the m
j
i obtains the
benefit from the auction. Similarly, the winner set W contains the winner APs. If ai is a winner AP, its
clearing price is Pi. When ai bid truthfully, its utility ui is defined as
ui =


Rki − Pi if ai ∈ W,
0 otherwise,
(4)
where Rki is the actual revenue that ai calculates for its winner cloudlet Ck. Let W
′ be the set of winner
cloudlets, and P k be the clearing price of Ck. Its utility u
k is defined as
uk =


P k − rk if Ck ∈W
′,
0 otherwise.
(5)
The social welfare can quantify the efficiency of our auction schemes. Let SW be the social welfare,
6which means the total utility of all participants in the auction. It is defined as
SW =
n∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
uji +
n∑
i=1
ui +
K∑
k=1
uk. (6)
TABLE 1
Symbols of Participant
Definition Ck ai m
j
i
Quantity K n ni for ai
Capacity or Workload Capk − lj
i
Cost, Revenue or Valuation Cos(k) Rk
i
vj
i
(k)
Reserve price or Budget rk B
k
i
bj
i
(k)
Clearing price P k Pi p
j
i
Utility uk ui u
j
i
Winner set W ′ W wi
3.2 System Model
The Fig. 1 shows the model of our three-stage auction schemes. In the first stage, we divide MUs into
n small groups according to the APs that connect the MUs and cloudlets. Then, in each group the AP
calculates its total revenue for each cloudlet, e.g. the AP ai calculates the revenue R
k
i for cloudlet Ck. R
k
i
is calculated according to the budget of the MU group in ai, and these budgets are their bids for Ck, i.e.,
bji (k)(j ∈ [1, . . . , ni]). The total revenue quantify the preference of the MU group on each cloudlet. In the
AP ai, the MU m
j
i which has been utilized in calculating R
k
i will be regarded as a potential winner for
cloudlet Ck, and its potential price is p
j
i (k). If ai wins Ck in the next stage, Ck will share its resources with
mji , and m
j
i will be charged at p
j
i (k), i.e., its clearing price p
j
i equals to p
j
i (k). On the other hand, Ck will
only share its resources with the MU who paid for it. We cannot ensure that all MUs in ai can be served
by Ck, due to the constraints of economic properties. The rest of MUs will be left to the next round of the
auction, which is not within the scope of this paper.
In the second stage, APs submit their budget to each cloudlet. This budget is the total budget of the MU
group in the corresponding AP, which is generated base on the revenue for each cloudlet. For instance,
the budget of ai for Ck is B
k
i which is the price that ai bid for Ck. For each AP, its revenue R
k
i is provided
by its MU group. It is a real value, and the budget Bki is generated by itself, we can easily find that both
Rki and B
k
i are public information. Therefore, we can easily verify that whether ai bid truthfully or not.
After that, we try to match cloudlets with APs while subjecting to our desired properties. As a result, for
the winner set of cloudlets W ′ and the winner set of APs W , the matching result between W ′ and W can
be defined by the mapping function σ()˙. For example, σ(i) = k means cloudlet Ck is assigned to AP ai,
and their clearing prices Pi and P
k are same.
Then, in the third stage, the winner MUs set in ai is wi, winning APs will charge them according to
their potential winner price generated in the first stage.
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Fig. 1. Three-stage auction model.
3.3 Desirable Properties
3.3.1 Truthfulness
Let θ be a positive number. The participants may pay an extra cost θ to figure out how to bid in the auction
scheme that makes them benefit more. When MU mji bid untruthfully, we define the utility u˜
j
i as follows.
u˜ji =


vji (k)− p
j
i − θ if m
j
i ∈ wi,
−θ otherwise.
(7)
Similarly, we now define the utility u˜i for the case of that AP ai bid untruthfully.
u˜i =


Rki − Pi − θ if ai ∈W,
−θ otherwise.
(8)
The extra cost θ varies for different MUs and different APs. The different market situation also causes
different extra cost even for the same MU (or the same AP). In this paper, we define truthfulness as a
weakly dominate strategy as mentioned in [9], where the player cannot improve its utility by bidding
an untruthful bid in truthful auction scheme. Truthfulness is significant for an auction, we must ensure
uji ≥ u˜
j
i and ui ≥ u˜i for each MUs and APs to keep our auction truthful. In our auction scheme, we discuss
the truthfulness in which only one player can change its bid or strategy, and the others cannot.
83.3.2 Budget balance
The total price charging for buyers is not less than the total price paid for sellers. If σ(i) = k, then
n∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
pji ≥
K∑
k=1
P k + (
n∑
i=1
Rki −
n∑
i=1
Pi).
3.3.3 Individual rationality
For sellers, they cannot benefit at a price smaller than it’s asked, i.e., P k ≥ rk. For buyers, they cannot
be charged at a price bigger than it’s bid, i.e., bji (k) ≥ p
j
i (k) = p
j
i if σ(i) = k. For APs, we define their
individual rationality as Rki ≥ B
k
i ≥ Pi if σ(i) = k.
3.3.4 Computation efficiency
We will prove that the schemes can be performed in polynomial time.
4 AUCTION SCHEMES
In this section, we describe the proposed three auction schemes. The first is for Three-stage Auction scheme
for Cloudlet Deployment, named TACD. The second, named TACDp, is an improved version of TACD by
refining the first stage of the auction scheme. The third is called TACDpp, that is derived from TACDp by
improving the mapping approach in its second stage.
4.1 Framework of the Schemes
All these three schemes are inspired by the idea of “group-buying”. Each scheme consists of three stages.
In stage I, APs calculate the revenue from their small group of MUs, and figure out the potential winner
MUs for each cloudlet, the algorithm used in this stage is named ACRC. The revenue matrix is indicated as
{Rki }(i ∈ [1, . . . , n], k ∈ [i, . . . ,K]), which is formed by the revenues of the APs for each cloudlet. APs can bid
for cloudlets according to {Rki }, and these bids form the budget matrix {B
k
i }(i ∈ [1, . . . , n], k ∈ [i, . . . ,K]).
In stage II, we match APs with cloudlets according to the budget matrix {Bki } and the reserve price vector
{rk}(k ∈ [1, . . . ,K]), where the vector is formed by the reserve price of cloudlets, and the algorithm in
this stage named ASC. In stage III, the winner APs, which are placed with cloudlets, allocate resources to
their winner MUs and charge these MUs.
4.2 Scheme 1: TACD
4.2.1 Stage I: Calculating Revenue
The algorithm used in the first stage of TACD is named ACRC. For more details, see Algorithm 1. At
first, for each AP such as ai, we calculate its revenue R
k
i for all cloudlets. Obviously, the revenue R
k
i is
calculated from the small group of MUs in ai. Let t
j
i (k) be the performance price ratio of the MU m
j
i .
In other words, tji (k) is the unit budget of m
j
i for the cloudlet Ck, and it is defined as follows.
9TABLE 2
Symbols in Algorithms
Symbol Definition
tj
i
(k) mj
i
’s performance price ratio on Ck
A Array of MU sorted by tj
i
(k)
lx The workload of the xth MU in A
Ax, Lx The first x MUs in A, and their total workload
s The maximum quantity of MUs in A while Ls ≤ Capk
Sx The revenue of the first x MUs in A
m The independent integer
wk
i
The potential winner MUs in ai for Ck
p The unit price of MUs
pj
i
(k) mj
i
’s potential price on Ck
top1, top2 The top factor in ACRC, ASC
A′ The randomly sorted AP set
D The profit matrix {Bk
i
− rk}
σ Mapping function from ai to Ck
Algorithm 1 ACRC: AP ai Calculating the Revenue vector for each Cloudlet
Input: Sorted MUs array A, cloudlets’ capacity set {Capk}
Output: ai’s revenue vector {R
k
i }, ai’s potential winner matrix {w
k
i } and ai’s potential price matrix {p
j
i (k)}
1: for k = 1 to K do
2: Maximizing the number s subject to Ls ≤ Cap
k and Ls + ls+1 > Cap
k.
3: If Lni ≤ Cap
k, then s = ni.
4: The revenue set {Sx} = GTR(A, s), and the revenue of the first s− 1 cases is S1, S2, . . . , Ss−1.
5: The integer m is randomly generated in [(s+ 1)/2, s− 1].
6: Then the revenue Rki = Sm.
7: ai’s potential winner set for Ck is w
k
i = Am.
8: Then the unit price p equals to the (m+ 1)th MU’s performance price ratio in A.
9: if mji ∈ w
k
i then
10: pji (k) = l
j
i · p
11: else
12: pji (k) = 0
13: end if
14: end for
15: return {Rki }, {w
k
i }, {p
j
i (k)}
tji (k) =
bji (k)
lji
, (9)
where lji is the workload of m
j
i , and the value of l
j
i is kept unchange no matter which cloudlet receives the
tasks offloaded by mji . The value of t
j
i (k) will increase with the increasing b
j
i (k), i.e., m
j
i will get a higher
performance price ratio on Ck if it has more budget on Ck.
The set A consists of the MUs in ai, where the MUs are sorted in descending order in terms of their
performance price ratio tji (k). Let Ax be the set of MUs which are the first x (x ≤ ni) members of A. Let
lx be the workload of the xth MU in A, i.e., l1 is the workload of the first MU in A. Let Lx be the total
workload of Ax, i.e., Lx = l1 + l2 + l3 + ... + lx. We try to find the index s in A to maximize Ls, in which
Ls ≤ Cap
k and Ls + ls+1 > Cap
k. If the total workload of the MUs in ai is less than or equal to Cap
k, i.e.,
Lni ≤ Cap
k, then s = ni.
Let Sx be the revenue which is generated by the first x MUs of A. Let Sx = p · Lx, where p is the unit
10
Algorithm 2 GTR: Getting the Revenue set
Input: A, s
Output: The revenue set {Sx}
1: Let {Sx} be the revenue set of the first s− 1 cases in A.
2: for x = 1 to s− 1 do
3: The unit price p is equal to the (x+ 1)-th MU’s performance price ratio in A.
4: Lx is total workload of the first x MUs in A.
5: Then Sx = p · Lx.
6: end for
7: return {Sx}
price which equals to the performance price ratio of the (x+ 1)th member in A. The Algorithm 2 which
named GTR is to get the revenue set {Sx}, where {Sx} = {S1, S2, . . . , Ss−1}. In order to keep the MUs
bid truthfully, we randomly generate an integer m, where (s + 1)/2 ≤m≤ s − 1. The random number m
is independent of the bids of MUs’. Then ai’s revenue for Ck equals to Sm, i.e., R
k
i = Sm. The set of
potential winner of ai for Ck consists of the first m MUs of A, i.e., w
k
i = Am. The unit price p equals to the
performance price ratio of the (m+1)th MU in A. For the MU mji in ai, its potential price on Ck is p
j
i (k),
and pji (k) = l
j
i · p if m
j
i ∈ w
k
i , or p
j
i (k) = 0 if m
j
i /∈ w
k
i . It means if ai is allocated with Ck after the whole
auction scheme, then the MUs which mji ∈ w
k
i are winners, and they will be charged at p
j
i (k) by ai. The
sum of {pji (k)} equals to R
k
i , i.e., R
k
i = Σ
ni
j=1p
j
i (k), that is the preference of the MUs in ai for the cloudlet
Ck.
In TACD, we choose the random number m in [s+1)/2, s− 1] based on the following reasons. First, the
number m must be a random number to keep our auction truthful, and we will discuss it later. Second,
if the random number m is close to 1, the unit price p will be increased but the number of winner MUs
will be reduced, and it will go opposite side if m close to s. The performance comparisons for different m
values are mentioned in [11], the authors addressed that the APs will get more budget while the number
of MUs fall in [30%, 70%]. Similarly, in this paper the APs will get more budget when the number m is
randomly generated in [s+1)/2, s− 1]. Third, for each AP, the more budget it calculates the easier it wins
a more profitable cloudlet in the second stage. Finally, if AP gets the same revenue at m1 = 0.3s and
m2 = 0.7s, it will win the next stage at the same probability, but there is a big difference between the social
welfare derived from the two settings of m. It is clear that m = 0.7s is better. In summary, we generate
the random number in [s+ 1)/2, s− 1], so that AP can calculate a higher budget and get more profits.
To illustrate the detail of ACRC in TACD, we provide an simple example to demonstrate how this
algorithmworks for AP ai. In this example, the performance price ratios of the MUs on C1 and C2 are shown
in Table 3(a). Their workload vector is shown in Table 3(b), and the capacity vector of cloudlet is shown in
Table 3(c). For cloudlet C1, we sort MUs in terms of their performance price ratio t
j
i (1) in descending order
at first. Then the order of MUs in the sorted array A is: A = {m4i ,m
1
i ,m
5
i ,m
9
i ,m
6
i ,m
10
i ,m
2
i ,m
3
i ,m
7
i ,m
8
i }. Let
ls be the workload of the sth MU in A. The workloads of the MUs in A are {l1 = 1.4, l2 = 1.5, l3 = 1.6, ...},
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TABLE 3
Example for ACRC
(a) MUs’ performance price ratio on each Cloudlet
t1i (k) t
2
i (k) t
3
i (k) t
4
i (k) t
5
i (k)
C1 6 2.9 2.7 6.4 5.6
C2 6 2.5 4.5 5.7 3.1
...
t6i (k) t
7
i (k) t
8
i (k) t
9
i (k) t
10
i (k)
C1 3.6 2 1.7 3.7 3.6
C2 1.8 3.2 4.3 3.7 2.9
...
(b) The total workload of MUs’ offloading task(s)
l1i l
2
i l
3
i l
4
i l
5
i l
6
i l
7
i l
8
i l
9
i l
10
i
1.5 2.7 2.2 1.4 1.6 2.2 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.2
(c) Cloudlets’ resource capacity
Cap1 Cap2 Cap3 Cap4 Cap5 Cap6 Cap7 ...
17 22 25 11 19 21 18 ...
which are shown in Fig. 2. Let Lx be the total workload of the first x members of A. For instance, L3 =
l1+ l2+ l3 = 4.5. According to ACRC, s = 8, MUs m
7
i and m
8
i which are painted in red are losers in ACRC.
Then we calculate the revenue for this s − 1 cases. The unit price p for Sx is the (x + 1)-th performance
price ratio of MU in A, and Sx = p · Lx. For instance, the unit price p for S5 is the 6th performance price
ratio of MU in A, i.e., p = t10i (1) = 3.6. Then, S5 = p · L5 = 3.6 ∗ 9.1 = 32.76. We get a random number
within (4, 7). Assume that m = 6. We ‘sacrifice’ MUs m2i ,m
3
i which are painted in yellow to keep ACRC
truthful. Therefore R1i = S6 = 32.8 and the unit price p = t
2
i (1) = 2.9. The first 6 MUs in this example form
the potential winner set for C1, i.e., w
1
i = {m
4
i ,m
1
i ,m
5
i ,m
9
i ,m
6
i ,m
10
i }. For these MUs, their potential price
pji (k) = p · l
j
i . In this example, their potential price in A is p
4
i (1) = 2.9 ∗ 1.4 = 4.06, p
1
i (1) = 2.9 ∗ 1.5 = 4.35,
p5i (1) = 2.9 ∗ 1.6 = 4.64, and p
9
i (1) = 6.96, p
6
i (1) = 6.38, p
10
i (1) = 6.38. For the rest of MUs m
j
i /∈ w
1
i , their
potential price pji (1) = 0. Then we can get the potential price set {p
j
i (1)}. It is similar for C1 when AP ai
calculates revenue for other cloudlets.
After all the APs have calculated the revenue of each cloudlet, the revenue matrix {Rki } is formed. Then
APs will bid for each cloudlet in the next stage. These bids constitute the budget matrix {Bki } which means
the APs’ budget for each cloudlet. All these APs have submitted their truthful bid if {Bki } = {R
k
i }, or there
must be one/some cheater(s). The later case is what we need to avoid.
4.2.2 Stage II: Matching Cloudlet for AP
The algorithm used in this stage is named ASC, more details are shown in Algorithm 3. In this stage, APs
deal with cloudlets according to the budget of APs and the reserve price of cloudlets. In TACD, we assign
cloudlet to AP in a greedy manner, as mentioned in the existing work [22]. In ASC, we generate the profit
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Fig. 2. Illustration of ACRC in TACD.
matrix D at first, where D = {Bki }−{rk}, and d
k
i = B
k
i −rk. Then we distribute the terms of APs randomly
to A′. For each AP in A′, we try to match it with an available cloudlet Ck to maximize the profit B
k
i − rk
by the algorithm FRM.
The algorithm FRM is shown in Algorithm 4. For the AP ai in A
′, then we try to match it with a most
profitable cloudlet among the rest of available cloudlets. The profit vector of ai is Di which is the ith row
of the matrix D. Then we select the largest element dki in Di. The cloudlet Ck is the most profitable cloudlet
for ai among the rest of available cloudlets. If ties, we choose the Ck with the smaller k. As a result, FRM
matches ai with Ck and return the matching to ASC. For this AP-cloudlet matching, its profit is d
k
i . Then,
the algorithm ASC judges that if their profit is a positive value, i.e., whether dki > 0. The budget of ai is
bigger than the reserve price of Ck if d
k
i > 0, i.e., if B
k
i > rk. Then we try to find a bid for Ck from the
other APs. The selected bid has the biggest value between Bki and rr. In other words, we try to find the
Bkj where B
k
i ≥ B
k
j ≥ . . . ≥ rk and i 6= j. If there is no such B
k
j , then ai fails to be allocated with Ck, and
we set dki = 0. Otherwise, we allocate Ck on ai, i.e., let σ(i) = k. The clearing prices of ai and Ck equal to
the highest bid between Bki and rk, i.e., Pi = P
k = Bkj . Then we add ai and Ck in their winner set, such
as W = W ∪ ai and W
′ = W ′ ∪ Ck. Finally, for the matrix D we set the values of all elements in the ith
row to 0. Meanwhile, we also set the values of all elements in the kth column to 0.
Algorithm ASC can ensure the utility of both APs and cloudlets if they are winners in the auction. For
each winner AP-cloudlet matching, their clearing price Pi, P
k are independent with Bki and rk, both ai
and Ck cannot modify the clearing price by themselves. This is helpful to keep the auction truthful.
4.2.3 Stage III: Charging for winner
In this stage, the winner APs choose the winner MUs according to their potential winner set, and then
charge them at their potential winner price pji (k). For instance, while ai wins Ck in stage II, the MUs in
the potential winner set wki is the winner MUs of ai. For each MU m
j
i where m
j
i ∈ w
k
i , it will be charged
by ai at the clearing price p
j
i , where p
j
i = p
j
i (k).
4.3 Scheme 2: TACDp
In this subsection, we propose a more efficient scheme named TACD plus (TACDp). The TACDp improves
the first stage of TACD by changing the generation method ofm in ACRC, so that the APs in TACDp can get
more revenue. In TACD, m is randomly generated in [(s+1)/2, s−1], it may sacrifice many MUs, resulting
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Algorithm 3 ASC: APs’ auction to Select suitable Cloudlet
Input: {Bki }, {rk}, D
Output: W , W ′, {Pi}, {P
k}, σ
1: Distributing APs randomly into A′.
2: for x = 1 to n do
3: Getting AP ai and its matching cloudlet Ck by algorithm FRM(D, A
′, x).
4: if dki > 0 then
5: if Bki ≥ B
k
j ≥ . . . ≥ rk, which j 6= i then
6: σ(i) = k
7: Pi = P
k = Bkj
8: W = W ∪ ai
9: W ′ = W ′ ∪ Ck
10: Setting the values of elements in ith row of D to 0
11: Setting the values of elements in kth column of D to 0
12: else
13: dki = 0
14: end if
15: end if
16: end for
17: return W , W ′, {Pi}, {P
k}, σ
Algorithm 4 FRM: Finding a Rational Matching to ai
Input: D, A′, x
Output: AP ai and it’s matching cloudlet Ck
1: Let ai denote the xth AP of A
′.
2: Let vector Di be the ith row of matrix D.
3: dki is the maximum of Di.
4: return ai, Ck
in the performance decrease of TACD, although it can keep the auction scheme truthful. In TACDp, we
calculate several profitable revenues and then randomly select one from them as the revenue of the target
AP. In this section, we assume that the default value of top1 is 3. Then, we select the top 3 profitable revenues
Sx1 , Sx2 , Sx3 from S, and m is randomly selected from {x1, x2, x3}, denoted as m = random{x1, x2, x3}. We
can also change the value of top1 to get a better result, e.g., top1 = 2, then we select the top 2 profitable
revenues Sx1 , Sx2 from S, andm = random{x1, x2}. The different value of top1 will lead to different average
revenue and different degree of truthfulness. The effect of top1 will be discussed in the next section.
To illustrate the first stage of TACDp, we calculate the revenue of ai on C2, which is shown in Table
3. The ACRC in TACDp is shown in Fig. 3. In this example, top1 = 3. Following TACD, we generate the
number s and the revenue set S, resulting in s = 10 and S = {8.5, 13.0, 21.9, 27.3, 31.3, 38.1, 40.3, 40.2, 33.8}.
The top 3 cases in S is S7, S8, S6, then m = random {6, 7, 8}, the average revenue is 39.5. It is worthwhile to
point out that, the average revenue in TACD is 36.7. Thus, the revenue of the APs in TACDp is improved.
The rest steps of TACDp are the same with TACD. Note that, the value of top1 must be larger than 1. In
this case, let Smax be the most profitable revenue of S, we cannot fix the revenue of AP at Smax. This is
because, we cannot keep ACRC truthful if we always choose Rki = Smax. For instance, Smax = S7, i.e.,40.3
in Fig 3 and the unit price p = t10i (2), i.e., 2.9 while MUs bid truthfully. For m
5
i , it’s valuation on C2 is
14
Fig. 3. Illustration of ACRC in TACDp.
v5i (2) where v
5
i (2) = b
5
i (2), i.e., 4.96, its potential price p
5
i (2) = p · l
5
i = 2.9 ∗ 1.6 = 4.64. We assume that ai
wins C2 in stage II, then m
5
i will be charged at clearing price p
5
i = p
5
i (2) = 4.64 in stage III. Therefore,
the utility of m5i is u
5
i where u
5
i = v
5
i (2) − p
5
i = 4.96 − 4.64 = 0.32. However, if m
5
i bid untruthfully, we
assume that m5i changes its budget on C2 to b
5
i (2) = 4.32 which is less than its valuation on C2. Then the
performance price ratio of m5i on C2 is t
5
i (2) where t
5
i (2) = 2.7 and it will be sorted behind t
10
i (2) according
to ACRC. L7 = L6 + l
10
i = 12.3 + 2.2 = 14.5, L8 = L7 + l
5
i = 14.5 + 1.6 = 16.1, and S6 = L6 ∗ 2.9 = 35.67,
S7 = L7 ∗ 2.7 = 39.15, S8 = L8 ∗ 2.5 = 40.25, then Smax = S8. If R
k
i always equal to the most profitable
revenue, then R2i = S8 and its unit price p = 2.5. We assume that the matching result are the same in stage
II, then m5i will be charged at the clearing price p
5
i = p
5
i (2) = l
5
i · p = 1.6 ∗ 2.5 = 4 in stage III. Then, if m
5
i
bids untruthfully, its utility is u˜5i where u˜
5
i = v
5
i (2)− p
5
i − θ = 4.96− 4 − θ = 0.96 − θ. m
5
i can improve its
utility if the value of the extra cost θ is small enough, e.g., θ < 0.96, when m5i bids untruthfully.
4.4 Scheme 3: TACDpp
We introduce another efficient algorithm named TACDpp in this subsection. The TACDpp is the improved
version of TACDp, which refines the second stage of TACDp. The difference between TACDp and TACDpp
is that, TACDpp replaces algorithm FRM with algorithm FRMG in ASC. The first stage of TACDpp is the
same as that of TACDp. In the second stage, TACDpp matches cloudlets for APs in a global way, which
is different with TACDp. In TACDpp, we match cloudlets with APs by algorithm FRMG, which is shown
in Algorithm 5. Let top2 be a small number, it is the top factor in FRMG, its default value is 2. For each
round, FRMG gets a random integer rnd in [1, top2], then selects the rndth profitable value d
k
i from the
profit matrix D, and it returns {ai, Ck} to ASC for further judgement. When the network is unbalanced
between supply and demand, i.e., K 6= n, TACDpp can perform better due to the global idea. It is also
worth to mention that we must ensure top2 > 1 which is similar with top1. It will be discussed later.
The performance comparison of the proposed schemes is shown in Table 4. This table lists the algorithms
employed in each stage and the generation approach of the number m.
5 DESIRED PROPERTIES
5.1 Truthfulness
Theorem 1: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are truthful in ACRC.
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Algorithm 5 FRMG: Finding a Rational Matching in the Global scope
Input: D, top2
Output: ai, Ck
1: if top2 > 1 then
2: rnd is the random integer in [1, top2]
3: else
4: rnd = 1.
5: end if
6: Finding out the rnd-th profitable matching dki from D.
7: return ai, Ck
TABLE 4
Comparison for TACD, TACDp and TACDpp
Schemes Stage I The number m Stage II
TACD ACRC+GTR [(s+ 1)/2, s− 1] ASC+FRM
TACDp ACRC+GTR One of top1 cases ASC+FRM
TACDpp ACRC+GTR One of top1 cases ASC+FRMG
Proof: To verify the truthfulness of ACRC, we only need to prove that MUs are truthful in our auction.
In TACD, for the MU mji , b
j
i (k) is the truthful bid of m
j
i . Let b˜
j
i (k) be the untruthful bid. Then the utility of
mji is u
j
i when it bids truthfully. Let u˜
j
i be the utility when it bids untruthfully. We prove that m
j
i cannot
improve its utility by submitting an untruthful bid as follows, i.e., u˜ji ≤ u
j
i .
There are four cases for MU mji in TACD:
1) MU mji fails in the auction both in truthful bid b
j
i (k) and untruthful bid b˜
j
i (k). Then, u
j
i = 0 and
u˜ji = −θ.
2) MU mji wins the auction while bid truthfully and fails in the auction while bid untruthfully. In this
case, uji ≥ 0, and u˜
j
i = −θ.
3) MU wins the auction both in truthful bid and untruthful bid. When mji wins the auction in TACD,
its clearing price is c in our rules. On the other hand, if mji also wins the auction in another bid,
from the definition of truthfulness, the clearing price is also c while other bids of MUs are fixed.
Then u˜ji = u
j
i − θ.
4) MU fails in the auction while bid truthfully and wins the auction while bid untruthfully. When
mji fails in TACD and it bids truthfully, the clearing price c is greater than or equal to its bid, i.e.,
c ≥ bji (k). And if m
j
i wins the auction in another bid b˜
j
i (k), it must have b˜
j
i (k) ≥ c, so b˜
j
i (k) > b
j
i (k)
and b˜ji (k) > v
j
i (k), then we have u˜
j
i ≤ u
j
i = 0.
We have now discussed the truthfulness of MUs in TACD, while MU mji bid for the kth cloudlet. And
the other cloudlets do not need care about whether mji cheat or not, if the kth cloudlet Ck is assigned to
the AP ai finally.
Similarly, MUs in TACDp and TACDpp are also truthful in ACRC, because these two schemes only
change the way we get the random integer m.
Theorem 2: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are truthful in ASC.
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Proof:
For TACD and TACDp, their algorithms in the second stage are similar to the algorithm fixed price auction
as mentioned in[22]. This auction scheme has been proved to be truthful, we only change the generation
manner of clearing price in TACD and TACDp while the transactions is done. Furthermore, the clearing
price is independent to AP and cloudlet in the second stage of TACD and TACDp. Therefore, TACD and
TACDp are also truthful for ASC.
For TACDpp in ASC, we ensure its truthfulness by the top factor top2, which is discussed in the
simulation section.
5.2 Budget Balanced
Theorem 3: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are budget balanced.
Proof:
In this paper, we only prove that TACD is budget balanced. The proof of TACDp and TACDpp are
identical to that of TACD.
In TACD, if σ(i) = k, ai ∈ W and Ck ∈ W
′, then the total clearing price charge for the MUs is val1
where val1 =
∑n
i=1
∑ni
j=1 p
j
i . Similarly, the total clearing price for cloudlets is val2 where val2 =
∑K
k=1 P
k,
the total clearing price for APs is val3 where val3 =
∑n
i=1(R
k
i −Pi). The total budget of APs is val4 where
val4 =
∑n
i=1B
k
i , then val1 = val4 according to ACRC, and val4 = val2 + val3 according to ASC. Then,
val1 = val4 = val3 + val2, and val1 ≥ val3 + val2, i.e.,
n∑
i=1
ni∑
j=1
pji ≥
K∑
k=1
P k + (
n∑
i=1
Rki −
n∑
i=1
Pi).
5.3 Individual Rationality
Theorem 4: The schemes TACD, TACDp and TACDpp are subject to the individual rationality.
Proof:
The individual rationality for TACD can be proved as follows. For sellers, according to the judgement
in ASC, the clearing price for cloudlets cannot smaller than they asked, i.e., P k is always bigger than rk.
For buyers, if MU mji wins the cloudlet Ck, the MU will be charged at p
j
i where p
j
i = p · l
j
i . p is the
performance price ratio of the mth MU in A, and p ≤ tji (k). Therefore, p
j
i ≤ t
j
i (k) · l
j
i = b
j
i (k).
For APs, we obtain Bki = R
k
i according to the ACRC. Also, the adjustment factor f is in the scope of
(0, 1) in ASC, thus, the clearing price of AP Pi = f ·B
k
i < B
k
i = R
k
i . Therefore, R
k
i ≥ B
k
i ≥ Pi.
The proof of individual rationality for TACDp and TACDpp iss the same as that of TACD.
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5.4 Computational Efficiency
Theorem 5: The time complexity of TACD as well as TACDp is O(K · n logn).
Proof:
For ACRC, the sorting needs O(n logn) time, finding the number s takes O(n) time, and the algorithm
GTR also takes O(n) time. The time complexity of ACRC in TACD and TACDp is O(K · n logn). For
ASC, distributing APs randomly takes O(n logn) time, the algorithm FRM takes O(K) time. So, the time
complexity of ASC in TACD and TACDp is O(n · K). Therefore the total time complexity of TACD and
TACDp are O(K · n logn).
Theorem 6: The time complexity of TACDpp is O(K · n2).
Proof:
The time complexity of ACRC in TACDpp is the same as that of TACDp, which is O(K · n logn). For
ASC, the algorithm FRMG takes O(n ·K) time, which is different from the algorithm FRM. Thus, the time
complexity of ASC in TACDpp is O(K · n2). Therefore the total time complexity of TACDpp is O(K · n2).
6 NUMERICAL RESULTS
6.1 Simulation Setup
In this paper, we simulate our works on MATLAB R2014a. In the simulation, the capacities of all the
cloudlets follow the normal distributionN(25, 5) and each capacity Capk satisfy the constraint 10 ≤ Capk ≤
30. Its cost factor c(k) follows to the normal distribution N(0.75, 0.1) and 0.5 ≤ c(k) ≤ 1. Then, its reserve
price {rk} can be calculated by formula 2. For each AP such as ai, the number of MUs in ai follows the
uniform distribution U(5, 30). For the MUs in ai such as m
j
i , their workload follow the normal distribution
N(2, 1) and 1 ≤ lji ≤ 3. Their valuations for each cloudlet follow the uniform distribution U(1, 15).
We compare our auction schemes with the strategy Heaviest Access Point First (HAF) [7]. HAF is an
efficient scheme for cloudlet placement and resource allocation without auction. In this paper, the strategy
HAF is working in the following way, at first, HAF sorts APs in terms of the total workload of MUs in
descending order. Then, HAF sorts cloudlets in terms of their capacity in descending order. At last, HAF
matches cloudlets for APs by turns. For instance, HAF assigns the first cloudlet whose capacity is the
biggest to the first AP whose total workload of MUs is the heaviest, then HAF assigns the second cloudlet
to the second AP and so on. If Ck is assigned to ai, the budget that ai bid for Ck is B
k
i . It is calculated
using the method as in ACRC, but the number m is a fixed integer where m = s, and the potential winner
MUs is the first m MUs in A, i.e., Am. The unit price p charged by AP is the performance price ratio of the
mth MU in A. In HAF, ai only needs to calculate the budget on Ck. The transaction between ai and Ck will
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be done if Bki ≥ rk, which is different from the algorithm ASC. It is obvious that, if HAF is an incentive
mechanism, then it is untruthful. Moreover, the time complexity of HAF is O(n logn)+O(K logK). In the
first stage of HAF, the sorting of APs and cloudlets takes O(n logn) and O(K logK) time, respectively. In
the second stage of HAF, the matching algorithm takes O(n) + O(K) time.
6.2 Simulation Results
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Fig. 4. Utility of Cloudlet.
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Fig. 5. Utility of APs.
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Fig. 6. Utility of MUs.
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Fig. 7. Social welfare.
In the first part of our simulation, the top factors top1 and top2 are set to 2, and the market is balanced,
i.e., K = n. The utility of cloudlets, APs and MUs are shown in Fig. 4, Fig. 5, and Fig. 6, respectively.
The social welfare of auction schemes are shown in Fig. 7. There are big differences between our schemes
and the HAF in the first three figures. Fig. 4 shows that our schemes are good for cloudlets, while Fig. 5
show that our schemes are weak for APs. The differences are caused due to the following reasons. In our
schemes, we select a bid Bkj other than B
k
i and rk to keep ASC truthful where B
k
i ≥ B
k
j ≥ rk. The clearing
price of this transaction is Bkj which is bigger than rk. However, if Ck is assigned for ai, HAF does not
care about the truthfulness, the transaction is done while Bki ≥ rk, and the clearing price is equal to rk.
As a result, the utility of cloudlets is close to 0 in HAF as shown in Fig. 4. Moreover, the APs in HAF
may catch many profits during the transaction as shown in Fig. 5. For the Fig. 6, it shows that HAF is
more profitable for MU than our algorithms. It is because that the winner cloudlet in HAF serve for more
MUs by a greedy manner and these MUs are charged with a lower unit price by AP than our schemes.
In our schemes, the number of winner MUs is m − 1 where m ≤ s, the unit price of these MUs is the
performance price ratio of the mth MU in A. However, the number of winner MUs in HAF is m where
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m = s, and the unit price of these MUs are the performance price ratio of the sth MU in A. Then, the
number of winner MUs in HAF is more than our schemes, and these winner MUs are charged by a lower
price than us. Therefore, it is more profitable for MUs as show in Fig. 5. The social welfare demonstrates
that, while the number of MUs is 1000, the social welfare in TACD is 5% less than HAF, TACDp is 4.5%
higher than HAF, and TACDpp is 5.6% higher than HAF. Moreover, our schemes perform better if there
are more MUs in the wireless access network. For example, when the number of MUs is 1400, TACD is
1.7% less than HAF, TACDp and TACDpp are 7.6% and 7.9% higher than HAF respectively.
If the number of APs is bigger than the number of cloudlets, i.e., n > K , the performance of our auction
schemes in “unbalanced market” is shown in Fig. 8. In this situation, the TACDpp performs better than
that in the balanced market, because the global matching algorithm FRMG works better.
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Fig. 8. Performance in unbal-
anced market.
Now, we evaluate the second stage of TACDpp while modifying the value of top2 in a smaller data set,
and we verify the truthfulness of TACDpp through different values of B11 . In this section, we fix the value
of top1 at 2 and modify the value of top2 from 1 to 2 and then to 5. The utility of B
1
1 are shown in Fig.
9, Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, for the cases of top2 = 1, 2, 5, respectively. In these figures, the solid line shows the
profit of a1 when a1 bids truthfully in ASC, i.e. B
1
1 = 85.5. The dotted line shows the profit of a1 when it
bids untruthfully from B˜11 = B
1
1−80 to B˜
1
1 = B
1
1 +50 with the increase unit of 1. The result is the averaged
over 100 random instances. Fig. 9 is the utility of AP for the case of top2 = 1. In this case, TACDpp matches
cloudlet Ck for AP ai, while the profit of this matching is the most profitable one in the rest of cloudlets
and APs. The utility of a1 is U1 and it is 18.7. It is stable and profitable, because TACDpp always makes
the same strategy to match cloudlets with APs. In such a fixed strategy, a1 will get the same profit if it
bids truthfully, so the solid line is straight in Fig. 9. However, it is hard to check whether TACDpp is
truthful in ASC while top2 = 1. Because it may has some ”bugs”, in which APs can benefit more from
their preferred cloudlet, by biding budgets that lower than their revenues. For instance, as we can see in
Fig. 9, the utility of a1 is U˜1 where U˜1 = 22.7− θ, while a1 bid untruthfully among {64.5, 65.5, 66.5}. U˜1 is
larger than U1, if θ < 4. It is because that, when B˜
1
1 = {64.5, 65.5, 66.5}, the profit B˜
1
1 − r1 is so big that a1
still wins C1. Also, there is another AP ax whose budget is B
1
x where B
1
x ≤ 64.5, and it is the largest B
1
j
in which B1j ≤ B˜
1
1 , j ∈ [1, n] and j 6= 1. Then, the clearing price will be much lower than that when it bids
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truthfully. Therefore, if AP a1 pays some extra price θ to figure out these more profitable cases, it will get
more profits firmly by bidding untruthfully.
Simulation results of TACDpp are shown in Fig. 10 where top2 = 2. The solid line shows the utility of
a1 while it bids truthfully. This line is not a straight line as shown in Fig. 9, as the matching strategy is
not a fixed pure strategy anymore.
When top2 = 2, the matching strategy turns to a mixed strategy, we combine the following two strategies
with equal probability, i.e. 1/2,
1) Matching cloudlet Ck with AP ai whose profit B
k
i − rk is the most profitable one.
2) Matching cloudlet Ck with AP ai whose profit B
k
i − rk is the second profitable one.
So the utility of a1 is not a stable value, even a1 always bid truthfully. The utility varies within an
interval near 18, which is shown in green solid line. In contrast, the green dotted line shows the utility of
a1 while it bids untruthfully. There are also some more profitable cases while a1 bids untruthfully, such
as {64.5, 65.5, 66.5} as occour ed as in the case of top2 = 1. But the difference is that, if top2 = 2, a1 can
also benefit more in those cases with the probability of 50%. Otherwise, a1 will be matched with other less
profitable cloudlets, and it also must pay an extra cost θ to find those cases. Therefore, there is not any
evident case in which a1 can get more utility than the truthful case. It is worthless for a1 to pay an extra
cost θ to determine how to bid untruthfully. Therefore, TACDpp is truthful while top2 = 2.
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Fig. 9. top2 = 1.
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Fig. 10. top2 = 2.
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Fig. 11. top2 = 5.
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Fig. 12. Comparison.
Similarly, Fig. 11 shows the utility of a1 while top2 = 5. It is also a mixed strategy by 5 pure strategies,
with the probability of 1/5 for each strategy. These 5 pure strategies are used to match cloudlets to APs.
The jth pure strategy is corresponding to the jth profitable value of Bki −rk for j = 1, 2, · · · , 5. In the mixed
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strategy, the utility of a1 varies with a larger range than that in Fig. 10 while a1 bid truthfully. The value
of its utility fall in [12, 14.5], and it is less than that in Fig. 10. In other words, the strategy for top2 = 5
is less profitable and less stable than the strategy for top2 = 2, while APs bid truthfully. This is because
the stronger randomness brings APs many solutions which are not profitable. For truthfulness, there is no
evidence that a1 can get more utility than the truthful one.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed efficient auction schemes for cloudlets placement and resource allocation
in wireless networks to improve the social welfare subject to economic properties. We have introduced the
group-buying model to inspire cloudlets to serve the MUs. In our auction schemes, MUs can get access
to cloudlets through APs, according to their preference and resource demands for cloudlets. The whole
three entities MUs, APs, and cloudlets are motivated to participate in resource sharing. We have verified
that our schemes are truthful, individual rational, budget balanced and computational efficient. Through
simulations, we have shown that our schemes TACDp and TACDpp outperform HAF by about 4.5% and
5.6% respectively, in terms of social welfare, for the case that the number of MUs is 1000.
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